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The De primo bello punico was Leonardo Bruni’s first published work of history. 
It was also one of his most successful. Contemporaries hailed the work as a masterpiece, 
even before it was completed.1 Upon publication, early in 1422, the De primo bello 
generated considerable excitement.2 Here, after all, was an extended, fairly detailed 
history of the first Punic War, written by the foremost humanist of the day. What better 
proof that the glories of classical learning had truly been revived? Partly on the strength 
of such an achievement Filelfo felt justified in ranking Bruni alongside the greatest of the 
Latin historians, Sallust and Livy.3 The papal secretary Biondo was even more explicit. 
Addressing his treatise De verbis romanae locutionis (1435) to Bruni himself, Biondo 
described him as having stepped in—with the De primo bello punico—to take the place 
of the long since departed Livy.4 
This was literally as well as metaphorically true. For as everyone knew, Livy’s 
own account of the first Punic War had perished along with the whole of the second 
decade of the Ab urbe condita. All that remained were the Periochae, or brief summaries. 
Bruni’s new work thus seemed destined to fill a significant gap in the surviving books of 
Livy. It provided knowledge about a period of Roman history previously known in the 
West only through the epitomes of writers like Florus, Eutropius, and the Christian 
apologist Orosius.5 It meant that the story of the first Punic War was once again available 
to Western readers in something approaching Livian completeness. When Angelo 
Decembrio copied all three known decades of Livy, in 1439, he was careful to copy 
Bruni’s De primo bello punico as well, in place of the missing second decade.6 
The manuscript data confirm the De primo bello’s status as a runaway success 
with the reading public. James Hankins has located some 160 manuscripts containing the 
original Latin text, and as many again of the early volgare translation,7 the latter possibly 
carried out under Bruni’s personal supervision.8 Nor did the work’s fortunes immediately 
decline with the advent of printing. I count at least 19 separate editions between 1471 and 
1545.9 It is significant, however, that most of these are of the volgare translation. 
Furthermore, of the five Latin editions, the first three present the De primo bello punico 
as a work of Polybius, translated from Greek into Latin by Leonardo Bruni.10 A subtle 
shift in the work’s fortunes thus appears to have occurred, as the learned public became 
aware of the Polybian account of the first Punic War, and the extent to which Bruni had 
relied upon it.11 A gradual waning of interest in Bruni’s De primo bello punico can be 
traced to the rising fortunes of Polybius in the Perotti translation.12 Perotti’s Latinized 
Polybius—first published in 1472, and frequently thereafter-- eventually drove Bruni’s 
work from the field altogether. The last Latin edition of the De primo bello punico 
appeared in 1537, the last Renaissance edition of the volgare text in 1545.13 
The success of the De primo bello punico in its own day suggests its status as an 
important source for understanding Bruni’s approach to history-writing. Yet modern 
assessments of the work have not been kind. The twentieth-century pioneers of Bruni 
scholarship were more or less unanimous in viewing the De primo bello as unworthy of 
serious consideration. Emilio Santini pointed out that the work lacked any sign of a 
critical approach to the sources: it contained, he wrote, Polybius and nothing but 
Polybius, despite Bruni’s claims to have consulted other authorities.14 Subsequent studies 
proved Santini wrong on this point. Bruni did honor his pledge to examine sources other 
than Polybius. Among the authors he utilized, but did not explicitly cite, were 
Thucydides, Strabo, Plutarch, Florus, and possibly Zonaras.15 Even so, Santini’s main 
point stood firm; Polybius was far and away Bruni’s chief source: the others were called 
into play only occasionally, to supplement the narrative. Perhaps this is why Hans 
Baron’s assessment remained virtually unchanged from 1928 onwards. He regarded the 
De primo bello punico as “essentially an adaptation from Polybius”.16  
Where twentieth-century scholars did busy themselves with the De primo bello 
punico, they did so from the perspective of Polybius. An article by Beatrice Reynolds still 
constitutes the only published attempt to examine the text with any real care. Yet 
typically Reynolds was not primarily interested in Bruni’s work itself. Her main objective 
was to assess its validity as a rendering of Polybius. To this end, she compared it to 
Perotti’s translation. Not surprisingly she came to the conclusion that Perotti’s work was 
much closer to the spirit and the letter of the original than Bruni’s.17 Reynolds realized of 
course that in adopting such an approach she was forcing Bruni’s work into a 
classification where it did not really belong. The De primo bello punico was never meant 
by Bruni to be a translation, or even to be in any way a faithful rendition of Polybius. 
Quite the contrary, as we shall see. 
The only other twentieth-century study of note is a contribution by Arnaldo 
Momigliano.18 It too has Polybius as its main focus. Momigliano wants to describe the 
fortunes of Polybius in the West. The first chapter of the story concerns early fifteenth-
century Florence, Leonardo Bruni, and the De primo bello punico. Unlike Reynolds, 
Momigliano does not offer any detailed textual analysis. His study is nevertheless 
perceptive. He is more cognizant than Reynolds of the inadequacy of translation as a 
critical category. He does not make an issue of Bruni’s fidelity/infidelity to Polybius. He 
acknowledges that Bruni’s declared intention was to write an independent work of 
history. Yet Momigliano too reaches substantially negative conclusions regarding the 
value of the De primo bello punico. Bruni, he writes, was essentially setting out to 
“Livianize” Polybius: “Bruni paraphrased and freely supplemented his Polybius to make 
him look like Livy”.19 
What I hope to show in the following pages is that “Livianization” is a somewhat 
misleading way of describing what Bruni was attempting to do in the De primo bello 
punico. Bruni’s devotion to Livy is of course not in doubt, nor is his desire to restore the 
missing sections of the lost second decade. But Bruni’s motivations in writing the De 
primo bello punico went far beyond the mere wish to imitate his Roman model. Nor was 
his work intended primarily as an exercise in literary style. What Bruni actually hoped to 
achieve was to provide his contemporaries with a history of the first Punic War that 
would speak to their immediate concerns. He wanted to satisfy the longing of statesmen 
and the learned public alike to know more about the early history of ancient Rome. It was 
the first Punic War that had launched the Roman Republic on its trajectory towards world 
empire. Yet this was one of the least-known periods of Roman history in the Latin West. 
Bruni’s intention was to bring the events of those remote times from obscurity into the 
full light of day, where they could be examined and admired. Of course his project 
involved a degree of “Livianization”, if only because Livy provided Bruni and his fellow 
humanists with the most acceptable model for writing history. But it was a model freely 
interpreted, a vehicle for making sense of and organizing the past, rather than a recipe to 
be rigidly followed.  
It can in fact be observed that many aspects of the De primo bello punico fail to 
respect Livian principles. Bruni does not, for example, structure his narrative in the 
Livian manner. He does not use a strictly annalistic mode of narration. He does not shift, 
as Livy does, from domestic to external affairs and then back again, on a year-to-year 
basis. Many other standard features of Livian derivation are missing: there are no 
extended speeches in direct discourse, no portents, no taking of the auspices. Unlike 
Livy, Bruni does not list alternative versions of the events he relates, nor does he indicate 
or discuss conflicting sources of information. If the De primo bello punico is 
“Livianized” historical narrative, it lacks many of the latter’s most common 
characteristics. 20  It thus seems logical to take into account the impact on the work of 
other classical historians. Foremost among these stands Polybius. Bruni was, after all, the 
first Western historian since antiquity to make a careful study of Polybius. The following 
article will try to define more precisely the nature of Bruni’s debt to Livy. But it will also 
consider the limits of Livy’s influence, and the extent to which Bruni incorporated 
aspects of Polybian historiography into the framework of the De primo bello punico. 
Before proceeding any further, a few words about the text itself are in order. The 
De primo bello punico is a fairly substantial work consisting of some 40,000 words. It 
occupies 87 octavo pages in the 1537 Augsburg edition I shall be using.21 This edition 
presents the work as divided into two books. Many editions, however, and most of the 
manuscripts I have examined have the work divided into three books, with a break 
between Books One and Two coming at page 32, line 16 of the Augsburg, and Augsburg 
Book Two labeled as Book Three.22 The division into two or three books has no bearing 
on the contents. The subject of Augsburg Book One, containing two-thirds of the work, is 
the first Punic War, related largely, but not solely, on the basis of Polybius I, 7-63. The 
subject of Augsburg Book Two is first the Numantine War that followed upon the defeat 
of Carthage (Polybius, I, 66-88), then the wars of the Romans against the Illyrians and the 
Celts (Polybius, II, 2-35). In what follows I shall focus exclusively on Bruni’s account of 
the first Punic War.  
The Augsburg edition, like a number of manuscripts and other editions, lacks 
Bruni’s preface. This is best consulted in the version established by Hans Baron.23 The 
preface is indeed the first port of call for any serious consideration of the De primo bello 
punico. In it Bruni defines the purpose of the work, and sets forth his methodological 
principles. Three points in particular are of primary importance: 1) Bruni’s evaluation of 
the historiographical traditions relating to the first Punic War; 2) his assessment of the 
place of Polybius within these traditions; 3) where Bruni positions his own work in 
relation to such issues. 
Bruni’s discussion of the historiography of the first Punic War represents a 
significant innovation. Latin historians were not in the habit of beginning their works 
with a review of the existing literature. Still less were they inclined to engage in specific 
critical discussions of their predecessors. Yet in his preface Bruni does just that, 
identifying in Philinus of Acragas and Fabius Pictor the ultimate sources of two 
traditions: one pro-Carthaginian and one pro-Roman. Bruni derives the terms of his 
discussion from Polybius, I, 14-15. Comparison, however, reveals that Bruni attenuates to 
a large degree Polybius’ main point. What Polybius says is that both Philinus and Fabius 
wrote their accounts of the war in order to justify the side of their choice: Philinus the 
Carthaginian and Fabius the Roman. Their histories, as a consequence, are not 
trustworthy. Polybius illustrates what he means by offering a critical analysis of Philinus’ 
version of the opening battles of the war, in 264 B.C. He demonstrates that Philinus’ 
account of these events deliberately falsifies what actually occurred, in order to present 
the Carthaginians in a better light. Tendentiousness and distortion run throughout the 
whole of Philinus’ work, according to Polybius, and the same may be said of Fabius 
Pictor. Thus Polybius identifies both Philinus and Fabius as propaganda historians. 
Polybius proposes to set out on a different course, one that will be impartial, and thus 
present the truth about what happened. 
Bruni’s reprise of this famous passage is revealing. It shows first of all that he was 
unwilling to accept the full impact of Polybius’ assessment of Philinus and Fabius. Thus 
while Bruni admits that both Philinus and Fabius tended to favor their own sides, he tries 
to limit the damage by claiming that their partisanship affected only their explanations of 
the causes of the war, not their actual narratives of events.24 Yet Polybius had 
demonstrated the latter to be the case, as well as the former. Either Bruni did not 
understand, or he did not appreciate Polybius’ point regarding the importance of 
impartiality. Indeed Bruni not only fails to acknowledge this point, he blithely brushes it 
aside and makes Polybius himself a follower of Philinus! Far from developing Polybius’ 
fundamental insights on the critical function of history, Bruni banishes them in favor of 
another view: that all history writing should reflect a particular political perspective. Livy 
himself Bruni proudly describes as “the father of Roman history” and a follower of 
Fabius Pictor.25 
Bruni thus celebrates Livy as the ultimate in patriotic history: if Books XVI-XIX 
of Livy had survived, there would be no need to write a new history of the first Punic 
War.26 Such a statement indicates how Bruni intends to position his own work. The De 
primo bello punico is meant to replace the lost portions of Livy on the first Punic War. 
Yet it should be emphasized that the primary purpose of Bruni’s project lies in its 
unashamedly patriotic character. Bruni writes out of patriotic duty to his homeland, 
because he feels, as he puts it “…moved, for the glory of our ancestors, lest the record of 
their splendid and magnificent deeds be allowed to perish….”27 Bruni’s patriotic agenda 
also indicates why his project did not take the form of a mere translation of Polybius into 
Latin. Bruni’s branding of Polybius as a follower of Philinus was certainly unfair.28 Yet it 
was only too true that Polybius—in accordance with his principle of impartiality—did not 
always have praise for the Romans.29 Polybius’ priorities lay elsewhere. His approach 
was technical, political, pragmatic. It valued truth about the past not so much for its own 
sake, as for its usefulness as a foundation for the study of human affairs.30 Bruni too—as 
the present study will later make clear--could at times appreciate the validity of Polybian 
approach. His work reveals an uncanny ability to move between Livy and Polybius, 
incorporating aspects of both. Yet his underlying devotion to the Roman cause never 
wavered. What he essentially set out to do in the De primo bello punico was to recast the 
Polybian material into a pro-Roman account.  
The model for this operation was ostensibly to be Livy. But with regard to the 
available materials there was a serious problem. Livy had been able to rely on a rich 
tradition of Roman sources, including, not only Fabius Pictor, but also Claudius 
Quadrigarius, Valerius Antias, and many others.31 Bruni had access to none of these. His 
Roman sources were limited to the Periochae, and to the already-mentioned epitomizers. 
Such meager pickings forced Bruni into almost total reliance on Polybius. Yet Polybius 
hardly provided an ideal platform, for reasons already suggested. Furthermore, Polybius’ 
Histories had their official beginning only with the year 220 B.C., i.e., with the start of 
the second Punic War. Polybius’ account of the first Punic War was written not in the 
form of a full-blown history, but as a sort of summary, which was meant to serve as an 
introductory sketch to the work as a whole.32 The chief characteristic of this sketch, or 
prokataskeue, was that it lacked the development of full-scale historia.33 It carried no 
extended speeches in direct discourse, for example, nor did it contain elaborate battle or 
siege descriptions.  
Polybius’ prokataskeue presented Bruni with a formidable challenge. True 
celebration of Roman deeds in the first Punic War could best be achieved through a 
Livian history with all the trappings. Yet the material required for such a treatment was 
lacking. Bruni alludes to this predicament  in the preface, especially where he contrasts 
the wealth of material available on modern history, to the dearth of material on ancient.34 
Equally significant is the fact that in the preface Bruni thrice refers to the De primo bello 
punico as constituting commentaria.35 The designation of a historical work as 
“commentaries” puzzled contemporaries, and Bruni made haste to clarify the meaning of 
the word in a famous letter to Giovanni Tortelli. Tortelli had been bold enough to query 
Bruni’s use of the term, and Bruni obliged him by underlining the differences between 
commentaria and historia. “The latter,” he writes, “is more ample and thorough; the 
former more contracted and less detailed. Even Livy, in relating the deeds of Romulus, of 
Hostilius, and of Tarquin, the early Roman Kings, does not proceed year by year, but 
gives us a summary. Polybius does the same, and he indeed is the approved author whose 
authority we have followed.”36  
Several points need to be made concerning Bruni’s comments. His distinction 
between commentaria and historia is first of all based on quantity rather than quality. 
Commentaria are less elaborate and less detailed than full-scale historia, yet they belong 
under the general rubric of history nonetheless. As proof of this point, Bruni cites the 
highest authority, Livy himself. Livy too, according to Bruni, uses something like the 
commentary form in his first book. Book One of the Ab urbe condita stands outside the 
annalistic framework used in the rest of the work. Livy begins his year by year treatment 
of Roman history only in Book Two. What Bruni seems to be saying is that commentaria 
need not follow the annalistic pattern that was considered obligatory in the case of 
historia. Tortelli may well have asked Bruni about the lack of a strict annalistic 
framework in the De primo bello punico. Bruni’s response was to clarify the particular 
form of the work as belonging to the category of commentaria, the existence of which he 
illustrates by citing both Livy and Polybius as examples.  
A second point indeed concerns Polybius. Bruni uses the expression “rerum 
summa” to characterize the alternative to annalistic narration. This expression seems to 
represent Bruni’s attempt to render the Greek term kephalaiodis. Polybius uses this term 
at several points to describe the mode of narration that prevails throughout his own 
prokataskeue.37 He also contrasts kephalaiodis with the fuller form of historical narrative 
that begins with Book Three of his Histories.38 Bruni’s understanding of commentaria as 
a less detailed form of historical narrative-- one not necessarily subject to the rules 
governing historia-- thus appears to be of Polybian derivation. It is indeed quite 
significant to find Bruni harking to Polybius as a model for historical composition, albeit 
with Livy’s Book One as a backup. The very application of the status of probatus auctor 
to Polybius was something Bruni could find in Livy.39 Yet he capitalized on his discovery 
to expand the range of forms and registers available within the field of history writing. 
A final point takes us beyond both Livy and Polybius. Both could be credibly 
cited as exemplars of the commentary form in which Bruni chose to frame the De primo 
bello punico. However, in both cases, the “commentary” stood as a prelude to a much 
larger work of history. It had no status as an independent work in its own right. As nearly 
as I can tell, Bruni was the first modern writer to develop the concept and reality of 
commentaria in this latter sense. Perhaps he was influenced to some degree by 
Ciceronian usage, and/or by the example of Caesar’s Commentarii, which were just then 
coming back into vogue.40 Yet Bruni’s discussion in the letter to Tortelli suggests that his 
careful study of Polybius provided the primary inspiration. The terms in which Bruni 
defines what he means by commentaria reflect on the whole Polybian rather than 
Ciceronian origins.  
The elements gleaned from both the preface and the letter to Tortelli thus offer 
something like a road map with which to explore the text of the De primo bello punico. 
Rather than with “Livianization”—a course which Bruni was forced to renounce, at least 
in its highest sense—our analysis should be concerned with Bruni’s “Romanization” of 
the Polybian narrative. This leads us back to issues of content, though form plays a role 
as well. Bruni could never in fact completely disassociate the need to celebrate Roman 
deeds from the formal implications of that fundamental premise. Thus alongside the 
Romanizing tendencies that characterize the De primo bello punico, we find Bruni 
engaging in a constant, often quite ingenious effort to elevate his text towards the 
standard of historia that he knows will nevertheless be impossible to reach. 
Bruni’s “Romanizing” agenda can be detected from the very first pages of the De 
primo bello punico. Bruni follows in general what Polybius relates concerning the origins 
of the first Punic War. According to Polybius the war originated with Rome’s decision to 
accede to the appeals for help launched by the Mamertines, a group of Campanian 
mercenaries who had seized control of Messina. Their position had come under threat 
from the rising power of King Hiero of Syracuse, and they had been forced into reliance 
on a Carthaginian garrison for protection. Their appeal to Rome in 264 B.C. was 
apparently due to dissatisfaction with this arrangement, and perhaps also to the feeling 
that the Romans were “a kindred people.”41 
Bruni’s account is close to that of Polybius, but with several significant variations 
dictated by his assuming the Roman point of view. As Reynolds points out, Bruni 
represents the Mamertines in Sicily as essentially on the defensive.42 Polybius on the 
other hand, had stressed how the Mamertines acted as plunderers, ranging far and wide, 
and “levying tribute from many parts of Sicily.”43 Bruni also expands considerably on the 
notion of kinship between the Mamertines and the Romans. Polybius had mentioned this 
only in passing, making it sound more like an argument to be used by the Mamertines to 
sway Roman opinion in their favor. Bruni erects it into an unshakable principle of 
solidarity between peoples of Italian origin: “And the name of the Roman people 
prevailed among the Mamertines, because they themselves were of Italian origin, and 
preferred to entrust their safety to their own kind rather than to foreigners.”44 Bruni in 
fact makes this pro-Roman view the prevalent one among the Mamertines, whereas 
Polybius seems to suggest that the pro-Carthaginian faction also carried considerable 
clout.45 
Variations of a similar kind also appear in Bruni’s account of how the Romans 
reacted to the Mamertine appeals for help. Bruni follows Polybius, rather than Livy, in 
having the matter first discussed in the Senate, where no decision was reached.46 Like 
Polybius, Bruni then has the question being taken up by the plebs.47 It is indeed the 
popular assembly that makes the decision to intervene. The grounds for the decision, 
however, are reported differently by the two historians. Polybius has the commons being 
swayed over by the prospect of plunder.48 Modern commentators and historians too have 
stressed the persuading power of greed as a factor in determining the Roman decision to 
act.49 Bruni, however, studiously avoids any reference to greed as a motive: in his 
account the Roman people reach their decision on the basis of a carefully reasoned 
political calculation. Were Rome not to act, the Carthaginians would soon become 
masters of all of Sicily. From here they could easily pass over into Italy and threaten 
Rome itself. Expediency thus dictated Rome act immediately, before it became too late to 
mount an effective response.50 What is most interesting here is that the same chain of 
Roman reasoning appears in Polybius, but in the context of the Senate discussion.51 Bruni 
has thus shifted the high political debate from the Senate to the commons. This shift is 
perhaps not totally illegitimate in view of Polybius’ statement that the commons 
considered the same issues as those canvassed earlier in the Senate.52 But Polybius then 
makes clear that what tipped the scales in favor of military intervention was the prospect 
of booty being dangled before the eyes of the multitude. This Bruni elides. He clearly 
does so because it tells so heavily against Roman motivations. He wants the Roman 
response to hinge on high politics rather than on plunder. 
Adjustments of this kind continue as Bruni moves to relate the opening stages of 
the war. An early example occurs at Polybius, I, 11, 11. At this point a Roman force 
under the command of Appius Claudius has occupied the citadel in Messina, but finds 
itself besieged by the combined forces of Hiero and the Carthaginians. Polybius merely 
notes that the consul attempted to negotiate, but that when his diplomatic overtures were 
rebuffed he decided to offer battle. Bruni at this point develops a passage of his own, the 
purpose of which is to elevate and justify the consul’s peace initiative. It was not an act of 
desperation, but almost an obligation to seek peace, given that pre-existing treaties were 
still in force between Rome and Carthage. By the terms of these treaties, notes Bruni, 
Rome had every right to come to the aid of the Mamertines. But by the same token it was 
only right and just that she seek to achieve a fair peace before resorting to arms. Bruni 
stresses that such policy was “consonant with the honor of the Roman people,” providing 
peace could be obtained without prejudice to the interests of Rome and her allies. “As 
long as the independence of the Mamertines could be guaranteed,” he writes, “and the 
Syracusans kept in check, the Roman people would have little reason to fear the power of 
the Carthaginians.”53 Only when this high-minded diplomacy failed, says Bruni, did the 
consul find himself forced to do battle. Bruni’s insertion here has a dual purpose. On the 
one hand it is meant to stress the scrupulous concern for legality of the Roman 
commander. On the other hand, like the other changes so far introduced by Bruni, it 
presents Rome’s strategy as essentially defensive. Polybius tends to portray Rome as an 
aggressive power bent on expansion.54 Bruni does his best to attenuate this impression by 
re-writing many of the fundamentals of the Polybian narrative.  
Once the hostilities begin, Bruni also tries to exaggerate Roman military success. 
A prime example occurs with the opening engagement of the war. Polybius describes 
Appius Claudius and the Romans as fighting and winning two battles: the first against 
Hiero and the Syracusans, the second against the Carthaginians.55 Bruni tells a different 
tale: the Romans defeat Hiero, more or less as in Polybius, but there is then no follow up 
battle with the Carthaginians.56 Instead the latter, according to Bruni, seeing themselves 
suddenly stripped of their ally, retreat in panic without a fight.57 Bruni’s change has some 
justification in Roman tradition: both Periocha XVI and Florus, I, xviii, 6 mention only a 
battle with Hiero. Yet Bruni has gone on to embellish quite considerably his account. He 
has the Carthaginian soldiery “panic stricken and frightened out of their wits by the 
Roman might.” Bruni can perhaps be excused for preferring Roman tradition to Polybius. 
But his description of Carthaginian panic at witnessing the Roman performance on the 
battlefield against Hiero is pure invention, unsupported in the sources.  
It is worth returning now to a point raised earlier: Bruni’s Romanization of the 
Polybian narrative is not simply a question of changing content; it also implies 
developing the material as far as possible beyond the bare sketch offered by Polybius. An 
early example of Bruni’s efforts in this direction is his account of the siege of Agrigento 
in 262 B.C. Bruni must have been quite dissatisfied with Polybius’ rendition of the 
Roman siege of the city. Operations at Agrigento lasted for seven months, with the final 
Roman victory coming early in 261 B.C. Siege operations were of course one of the 
centerpieces of classical historical narration. They offered the historian a chance to 
display the elaboration and implementation of opposing strategies. They also provided 
dramatic confrontations, moves and countermoves that could be presented and analyzed 
in stages, as the action unfolded before the reader’s eyes. Yet Polybius’ account, by 
virtue of its belonging to the prokataskeue, failed to exploit the full narrative 
potentialities of the situation. Bruni thus set about rewriting the siege of Agrigento into a 
more elaborate form. This could only result in a further enhancement of the Roman name. 
One important feature that Bruni adds is the element of strategy. Polybius, for 
example, merely states that the Roman commanders moved on Agrigento and “shut the 
Carthaginians up within the walls”.58 Bruni builds up to this point more gradually. The 
move on Agrigento is part of a plan devised by the new consuls, Lucius Postumius and 
Quintus Mamilius.59 Their idea is to force the Carthaginians into making a choice: either 
they will have to come out and fight, or they will face the consequences of a long siege.60 
Bruni presents the Romans as eager to do battle; it is the Carthaginians who opt for the 
siege instead.61 The Roman consuls duly implement their siege plan. They are aware, 
writes Bruni, that there are 50,000 Carthaginian troops holed up in the city, and that such 
a multitude will soon exhaust even the massive stores of grain that have been set aside.62 
None of this is in Polybius’ account. Polybius does mention later on in his narrative that 
50,000 Carthaginians were confined within the city and began to starve.63 But he 
mentions this as something happening five months down the track, as a result of the 
prolonged siege. Bruni seizes on this bit of information, repackages it, and brings it 
forward to bolster his account of a preconceived Roman plan. 
Bruni’s amplifications gather force as his narration of the siege of Agrigento 
progresses. His next important insertion of new material comes at Polybius I, 18, 8. After 
five months of siege, Hanno is ordered to relieve Hannibal, the commander of the 
50,000-strong Carthaginian contingent in Agrigento. Bruni’s insertion typically focuses 
on the problem Hanno’s arrival poses to the Roman consuls in charge of the siege. They 
find themselves faced with a difficult dilemma: either to abandon the siege, or to stay 
with it and thus stand by helplessly and watch as Hanno ravages the countryside and 
threatens their lines of supply. After discussing which course of action to take, the Roman 
commanders decide to push on with the siege “in the face of any and all difficulties.”64  
In the instances noted so far, Bruni’s elaborations appear to be based on 
conjecture, and on the desire to fill in the Roman side of the story. They also tend to 
showcase Roman virtues, in the present case constantia, or tenacity in the face of adverse 
circumstances. But there are also times when Bruni’s changes to Polybius are prompted 
by information gleaned from other sources. Bruni is especially eager to add any 
information that might augment Roman glory, or in some way diminish the 
accomplishments of the enemy. One example of the latter concerns Hanno’s occupation 
of Herbesus, the Roman supply base. Polybius relates this incident in his usual matter-of-
fact way at I, 18, 9. Bruni fills in extra detail: he describes how Hanno, once established 
at Heraclea, cast his eyes around, looking for some way to break the siege.65 His gaze 
then come to rest on Herbesus, but he does not “surprise and occupy” the place as in 
Polybius. Rather Bruni has Hanno receiving Herbesus “through treachery.”66 Bruni 
probably borrowed this detail from Diodorus Siculus XXIII, 8, 1.67 
There are considerable divergences too between Polybius and Bruni over what 
happened once Hanno found himself in control of the Roman supply base at Herbesus. 
Polybius stresses that this event transformed the entire situation at Agrigento. The 
Romans, he writes, became both besiegers and besieged. They were soon so wracked by 
privation that they contemplated raising the siege, and would have done so had not Hiero, 
now their staunch ally, kept them supplied with the strict necessities.68 Bruni will have 
none of this. Instead, he describes how the Romans stood firm, forcing Hanno to redouble 
his efforts to cut off the Roman line of supply.69 Where Polybius has Hanno attacking a 
depleted and demoralized Roman army, weakened by starvation and dying of disease,70 
Bruni presents Hanno’s move as a last desperate attempt to dislodge the Romans. This 
does not change the outcome of the initial engagement, in which Hanno and the 
Carthaginians score a limited success. 
In fact, Bruni has lifted much of Polybius’ material regarding this first 
engagement and moved it to his description of the second and decisive battle, which took 
place two months later, and which the Romans won. Bruni must have felt that it was 
more appropriate to expand on the circumstances of the Roman victory, while at the same 
time subtracting detail—and thus importance—from the initial Carthaginian success. 
Thus the picture of the Romans as both besiegers and besieged Bruni moves to the 
second encounter.71 Similarly Bruni shifts the effects of starvation and disease on the 
Romans to a later stage in the proceedings.72 Bruni even provides an extended and quite 
graphic description of pestilence in the Roman camp, complete with an explanation as to 
why it was so deadly.73 Throughout these trials, writes Bruni, the will of the Roman 
commanders held firm. Their determination “triumphed over these difficulties, for they 
had resolved to endure all hardship and suffering rather than to give up the siege with no 
gain for their efforts.”74  
Bruni’s rearrangement of the Polybian material relating to the siege of Agrigento 
is thus accompanied by considerable elaborations. Most of the latter consists of 
extrapolations, though occasionally Bruni may draw upon another source. Bruni’s aim is 
to highlight the Roman side of the story. Agrigento shows him placing particular 
emphasis on the careful plans laid by the consuls, and on their perseverance in carrying 
them out. The final, extended account of the concluding operations offers Bruni the 
opportunity to stress the magnitude of these events. Indeed Bruni ends his account with a 
summation that encompasses all of the points he has been building up to throughout the 
narration: “At last, in the seventh month after siege operations had begun, Agrigento 
came under Roman control. Such was the effort put in by the soldiery, such the 
endurance shown by the leaders of the army, that this siege should be numbered among 
the most laborious of all time.”75 
Subsequent sections of the De primo bello punico tend to follow a similar pattern. 
Bruni continues to expatiate, particularly at crucial points in the narrative. A turning point 
comes, for example, in 256 B.C., with the Roman decision to carry the war into the 
Carthaginians’ North African homeland.76 Polybius reports this rather abruptly: “The 
plan of the Romans was to sail to Libya and deflect the war to that country….”77 Bruni on 
the other hand offers a picture of Roman deliberations as to whether such a step should be 
taken: “Meanwhile back in Rome there were constant discussions in the Senate and in the 
Commons about whether it would be advantageous to carry the war into Africa. It was 
clear that the way down there lay open, and that the peoples of Libya were unwarlike, 
besides which their fields lay rich and ripe for plunder, as happens when peace has 
reigned in a country for such a long time.”78 The picture is not total fabrication on 
Bruni’s part. He seems to have worked up and transposed a number of details from 
Polybius I, 10 on the initial deliberations of the Romans as to how to react to the 
Mamertine appeal for help in 264 B.C. Bruni states, for example, that discussions took 
place in both the Senate and the Commons. He also mentions the prospect of booty as an 
extra enticement, something he had not done in his earlier rendition of Polybius I, 10. 
So far we have seen how Bruni rectifies, embellishes, and adds to the Polybian 
account. But there are also instances where he rewrites entire key episodes of the war. 
One of the more spectacular examples is his account of the aftermath of the battle of 
Adys, 256 B.C. This was a Roman victory on Carthaginian soil, coming hard on the heels 
of the Roman naval victory off Ecnomus. Polybius stresses how these two consecutive 
setbacks left Carthage in an extremely difficult position, with a Roman army ravaging the 
countryside and threatening the capital.79 According to Polybius, however, it was the 
Roman consul Regulus who invited the Carthaginians to discuss peace terms.80 Bruni 
diverges completely from Polybius on this latter point, and claims instead that it was the 
Carthaginians who sought to negotiate terms.81 Bruni is following Roman tradition here, 
as represented in this case by Eutropius II, 21, 4, and Orosius IV, 9, 1. Modern historians 
have tended to accept the Roman version as the most probable one, given the dire straits 
in which the Carthaginians found themselves.82 So thus far Bruni’s rectification of the 
Polybian account has both Roman tradition and greater probability as justification. 
What follows, however, is a piece of bold invention on Bruni’s part, for at this 
point in the narrative he opens a lengthy account of the peace negotiations. Polybius I, 31, 
5-8 does not elaborate on these, nor in general do the other ancient sources. Diodorus 
Siculus XXIII, 12, and Dio Cassius contain some indications, but Bruni seems to have 
used neither.83 Instead he appears to have allowed himself to be guided by something like 
what Collingwood called the historical imagination.84 Bruni’s account of the scene begins 
with some consideration as to why the Carthaginians would have felt confident they 
could secure peace on reasonable terms from the Romans. The basis for their belief lay in 
the ties of friendship and co-operation between the two peoples that pre-dated the present 
war. It was in fact not on account of any particular animosity that war had broken out, but 
rather because the Romans feared that an extension of Carthaginian power might threaten 
Italy.85 Such sentiments Bruni may well have borrowed from elsewhere in Livy.86 
Bruni next has the Carthaginian envoys repeat similar points in the presence of 
the consul. According to Bruni the envoys—in order to back up their case—even read out 
the terms of the previous treaties between Rome and Carthage.87 Bruni’s reconstruction 
of this scene may have no real basis in the sources, but it certainly strengthens his claim 
to have produced a work independent of Polybius. So too does the next phase in the 
narrative, for at this point Bruni opens what might be called a documentary parenthesis. 
The mention of the envoys reading out the previous treaties leads Bruni to reproduce 
them here for the benefit of the reader. “Given that we have mentioned the treaties in the 
course of our narrative,” he writes, “we deem it useful for a full understanding of these 
events to insert here the treaties themselves, from first to last, just as they were written up 
and agreed upon at the time.”88 To be sure, what Bruni reproduces here comes from Book 
Three of Polybius (III, 22-25), but the decision to place the material at this juncture in the 
narrative is Bruni’s own. 
As if to underline his independent use of the documents, Bruni strips them of 
Polybius’ explanatory detail (Polybius III, 23; 24, 14-15; 25, 6-9). Bruni also introduces 
some interesting modifications. These concern chiefly the second treaty. Polybius makes 
the point that the second treaty was actually less favorable to the Romans, since it 
extended the ban on their navigating or trading in areas the Carthaginians regarded as 
belonging to their sphere of influence.89 Bruni’s reproduction of the treaty not only 
suppresses Polybius’ remarks, it removes from the text of the treaty itself the passage 
further restricting the Romans’ freedom of movement.90 Similarly, Bruni adds a comment 
of Polybius (III, 24, 16) to the text of the treaty in an apparent effort to make it look more 
favorable to the Romans.91 In short, while Bruni presents an impressive documentary 
apparatus here, he is not above tampering with the contents. 
Bruni closes the documentary parenthesis at page 31, line 30. The transition is a 
smooth one, as we are reminded that the Carthaginians envoys read the treaties out in 
support of their peace initiative.92 The consul’s answer, however, is to remind the 
Carthaginians that the choice of war had been theirs and theirs alone, in 264 B.C., when 
Appius Claudius had attempted to resolve differences through negotiation: “The consul 
answered that he was by no means unaware of the contents of the treaties. Indeed for this 
very reason the Roman people were even more gravely offended at the fact that the 
Carthaginians had opted for war, rather than peace, when they were recently offered the 
choice by the consul Appius Claudius.”93 Bruni’s use of the word recently (nuper) here 
may be a slip, since eight years had elapsed. The reference to Appius Claudius 
incidentally explains Bruni’s extended treatment of the earlier Roman peace offering as 
compared to Polybius.94 Bruni wanted to make the point that the Romans were not 
ultimately responsible for starting the war. In fact, the consul’s next words to the 
Carthaginian envoys reaffirm the legality—in the light of the pre-existing treaties—of the 
Roman cause. “For there was no doubt,” Bruni has the consul say, “that the Roman 
people had been within its rights to extend its protection over the Mamertines, a free 
people. The terms of the treaty forbade the Romans to have possessions in Africa, and in 
Sardinia only; there was no such interdiction in regard to Sicily.”95 
What Bruni clearly wants to accomplish in this episode is to provide a full 
justification of the Roman position. The idea that the Romans had not—in coming to the 
aid of the Mamertines—violated their treaty obligations with Carthage was one Polybius 
too expressed, against Philinus, at the beginning of Book Three.96 But in view of the 
more limited scope of Bruni’s work, it was imperative to convey this idea during the 
course of the narration of the war itself. Bruni then hit upon the rather brilliant notion of 
inserting the issue at this particular point in the proceedings. His decision to do so may 
not reflect historical accuracy, nor is it based on any tangible evidence that such a 
discussion actually took place. Yet the expedient works extremely well. In addition to 
reiterating the Roman justification for the war, it also provides a rationale for the 
harshness of the conditions dictated to Carthage by Regulus. In Polybius, these are 
presented as the result of a flawed character (I, 31, 6), and Polybius later drives this point 
home in a passage only partially reproduced by Bruni.97  
Episodes such as these have understandably given rise to the impression that 
Bruni’s treatment of Polybius can be characterized as “Livianization.” Yet our analysis 
suggests that Bruni’s elaboration of this Polybian passage is far from having stylistic 
effect as its main purpose. Bruni’s reworking of the material has its rationale in the 
“Romanization” of the narrative, including the need to justify the Roman participation in 
the war. How far this leads Bruni down the road towards Livianism should be seen as an 
open question. There is no doubt that Livy is Bruni’s model. Yet there are limits on the 
extent to which Bruni is willing to move down this track. In the present case, for 
example, Bruni does not go so far as to invent extended speeches in oratio recta to 
represent the views of the opposing sides. He chooses instead to reproduce a series of 
diplomatic documents, interspersed with discussions reported in indirect discourse. He 
chooses, in other words, a Polybian rather than a Livian solution, and thus sacrifices 
elegance to utility.  
Many indeed are the points on which Bruni diverges from what might loosely be 
termed Livianism. He does not, for example, indulge in portents and marvels, as does the 
father of Roman history. He never mentions the auspices, even in the case of Claudius 
Pulcher, whose defeat off Drepana in 249 B.C. was attributed to the consul’s failure to 
respect them. The outline of Livy’s account of this famous incident is preserved in 
Periocha XIX, as well as in the Ab urbe condita, XXII, xlii, 9. According to this tradition 
Claudius Pulcher, prior to the naval battle off Drepana, took the auspices. When the 
sacred chickens failed to feed, he ordered them drowned. The Roman fleet then met 
disastrous defeat in the subsequent battle. Roman literary sources, including Livy, were 
more or less unanimous in paying homage to the popular belief that the defeat was due to 
the consul’s disrespect of the gods.98 Bruni, however, chooses to stand quite apart from 
this tradition. In relating the battle of Drepana, he does not even bother to mention the 
taking of the auspices.99 He assesses the outcome of the battle solely in relation to the 
skills, or lack thereof, displayed by the Roman commander and his opposite number 
Adherbal. Claudius Pulcher loses the battle not because he drowned the sacred chickens, 
but because he showed far less ability in directing operations than his opponent. 
In his account of the battle of Drepana, Bruni follows what might be called a 
Polybian line: one that evaluates human action on the basis of its greater or lesser 
efficacy. Closer examination suggests that Bruni even sharpens the Polybian analysis. 
First of all, in relation to the geographical location and strategic importance of Drepana, 
Bruni offers clarifications not present in Polybius.100 Next, when the Roman ships make 
their appearance on the scene, Bruni focuses attention on the Carthaginian reaction: the 
arrival of the Romans “sowed panic and fear in the ranks of the Carthaginians.”101 This 
sentence too is missing in the corresponding passage of Polybius. It might at first appear 
to be a sign of Bruni indulging in some dramatic effect of Livian derivation, but this is 
not the case, at least not primarily so. For the picture of general panic among the 
Carthaginians is chiefly meant to act as a backdrop for the cool behavior of their 
commander, Adherbal, whose quick thinking will save the day. 
Bruni’s acount of the battle itself follows that of Polybius, but with extra touches 
that bring out even more forcefully the skill of Adherbal. Polybius, for example, has 
Adherbal quickly call his men to assembly on the shore, where he addresses them very 
briefly.102 Bruni maintains the oratio obliqua, but extends the speech in the following 
terms. Adherbal, writes Bruni, “concluded his speech to his men by saying that he was 
not sending them into danger but asking them to join with him in a daring enterprise. He 
therefore would go first into battle, their leader not just in word but in deed; they should 
fix their eyes on his ship and follow it.”103 To be sure, Bruni draws this concept from 
Adherbal’s subsequent actions as described by Polybius, I, 49, 12. But by extending the 
speech Bruni is able to reinforce the point being made about effective leadership. When 
Bruni comes to describe Adherbal leading his forces out to meet the Roman fleet, he 
carefully reminds the reader of the Carthaginian commander’s earlier speech to his men. 
Adherbal, writes Bruni in admiration, “led them into battle, just as he had promised he 
would.”104 
Bruni also draws a starker contrast than does Polybius between the effectiveness 
of the Carthaginian leader and the ineffectiveness of his Roman counterpart. The latter’s 
incompetence has immediate and disastrous consequences for the morale of the Roman 
fighting men. “The Roman commander’s bungling broke the spirit of his men from the 
very beginning of the battle,”105 writes Bruni in disgust. At the conclusion of the 
encounter, Bruni follows Polybius in ascribing full credit for the victory to Adherbal’s 
skill and courage. In fact, Bruni’s assessment of the actions of the Carthaginian leader 
goes somewhat beyond what Polybius writes at I, 52, 1. “Adherbal,” says Bruni, “won 
great praise as the man who, by virtue of his courage and skill, restored to his fellow 
Carthaginians their lost reputation as a sea power.”106 Bruni thus places Adherbal’s 
achievement within the context of the war as a whole. Drepana is not just a personal 
triumph but a collective one. It signals a revival of the Carthaginian claim to mastery of 
the seas. In a final flourish, Bruni repeats Polybius on Adherbal’s sending the Roman 
prisoners and captured ships to Carthage (Polybius, I, 53, 1). But Bruni adds the joy that 
this brought to the Carthaginians, and the showering of honors upon the victorious 
commander. “The Carthaginians greeted all this with a mighty outburst of joy,” writes 
Bruni, “and the highest honors were conferred upon Adherbal by a special decree of the 
Senate.”107 
Drepana shows Bruni rewriting Polybius not in order to “Livianize” him, but to 
bring into even sharper focus an essentially Polybian message about the reasons for the 
Roman defeat. Drepana was in fact a major success for the Carthaginian side. As one 
modern historian has written, it represented “the greatest victory won by either side in the 
war.”108 Bruni’s account actually improves upon that of Polybius to illustrate how the 
outcome of the battle was determined not by the gods, but by the skill, or incompetence, 
of the respective commanders. In short this is not Bruni rewriting Polybius to make him 
sound more like Livy; it is Bruni rewriting Polybius to make him sound more like 
Polybius.  
Our analysis suggests that Bruni could at times put aside his patriotic agenda in 
favor of a political realism of Polybian stamp. He could do this even when—as in the 
present case—the resulting tableau told against his cherished Romans, and tended instead 
towards the glorification of the enemy. Polybius, every bit as much as Livy, deserves 
recognition as one of Bruni’s masters in history. The De primo bello punico is not a 
document dictated by pure Livianism. It is the product of a fusion of various 
historiographical traditions: Livy, yes, but also Polybius, and no doubt Thucydides as 
well, whom Bruni reprises on the greater veracity of history, as opposed to poetry.109 
Indeed the more one considers the De primo bello punico, the less Livian it seems to be, 
in substance, despite its obvious Livian veneer.  
Further exploration tends to confirm this latter point. One notes, for example, 
Bruni’s tendency to treat with considerable skepticism the marvels that occasionally crop 
up in Livy’s account.110 One case of this kind concerns Bruni’s treatment of Regulus’ 
encounter with a giant serpent at the River Bagradas during the African campaign in 256 
B.C. The tale, though clearly quite fantastic, was well entrenched in the Roman tradition: 
it figures in Periocha XVIII, and Orosius gives it significant development, IV, 8, 10-15. 
Polybius of course makes no mention of this event.111 Bruni relates the incident on the 
basis of Aulus Gellius VII, iii, which preserves a fragment of the Roman annalist Aelius 
Tubero. Bruni’s account at first sounds fantastic enough. He writes that Regulus “slew a 
serpent of astonishing size that dwelt by the banks of the said river, after attacking it with 
missiles and stones hurled by catapults.”112 Yet on closer inspection, Bruni advances a far 
less absurd claim than those made in Periocha XVIII (“Attilius Regulus in Africa slew a 
serpent of portentous size with the loss of many of his soldiers”113) or in Gellius 
(“Tubero…has recorded that …Regulus…fought a stubborn and fierce battle with a 
single serpent of extraordinary size…; that in a mighty struggle with the entire army the 
reptile was attacked for a long time with hurling engines and catapults; and that 
when…finally killed, its skin, a hundred and twenty feet long, was sent to Rome”114). 
Bruni does, it is true, mention the 120 foot long skin of the serpent being sent to Rome, 
but he does so with tongue in cheek: “There are some who have written that the serpent’s 
skin, which was afterwards conveyed to Rome, measured 120 feet in length.”115 Those 
who have written such nonsense, Bruni implies, are not to be believed. Bruni thus 
manages to pay homage to this legend, even while eliminating its legendary elements. 
Regulus may well have killed a large snake in Africa. He may at a stretch even have fired 
projectiles against it. But he certainly did not fight the serpent with his “entire army”, nor 
did he sustain “the loss of many of his soldiers.” The serpent’s skin may well have been 
sent to Rome, but accounts of its being 120 feet long are to be classified as tall tales.  
Similar caution characterizes Bruni’s rendition of another famous incident 
concerning Regulus. This story relates how once defeated and captured by the 
Carthaginians, Regulus was later sent to Rome to negotiate an exchange of prisoners. 
According to the legend Regulus, once in Rome, advised the Senate against the exchange, 
even though it would have meant regaining his freedom. This refusal to place his own 
personal safety ahead of that of his country was widely celebrated in Roman literature, 
e.g. Cicero, De officiis III, xxvi-xxviii; Horace, Odes III, v. Livy too paid homage to this 
legend, if we are to judge by the contents of Periocha XVIII. Polybius, however, does not 
relate the incident at all, and modern historians are skeptical as to its containing even a 
kernel of truth.116 Bruni relates the episode in what might be described as minimalist 
terms. He does not mention the Livian assertion that the true purpose of the Carthaginian 
initiative was to negotiate a peace deal, and that the exchange of prisoners was only a 
secondary expedient. Bruni thinks it more likely that if Regulus really was sent to Rome, 
the intention must have been to effect an exchange of prisoners. Bruni adds that the 
Carthaginians must have felt that Regulus had some chance of succeeding.117 As for 
Regulus’ behavior once in Rome, Bruni divests it of any heroic dimensions. Regulus’ 
famous advice to the Senate is, according to Bruni, dictated by common sense rather than 
by heroism. Since he has been given slow-acting poison by the Carthaginians, Regulus 
notes that any exchange of prisoners would, from his personal point of view, be quite 
futile.118 This business of Regulus having been given poison comes from Aulus Gellius 
VII, iv, 1, who is reporting a passage from Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus. Poisoning is not 
mentioned by Cicero or by Livy, as it clearly tends to detract from Regulus’ value as a 
symbol of self-sacrifice for one’s country.  
Bruni’s treatment of this incident indeed tends to undermine the status of Regulus 
as an exemplar of patriotic duty. It suggests that while Bruni clearly intended to present 
the first Punic War from a Roman perspective, he stopped short of mechanically 
reproducing the standard emblems of Roman heroism. In the present case the discovery 
of new evidence, in the form of Aulus Gellius VII, iv, 1, led Bruni to diminish in a 
considerable way the heroic stature of Regulus. Here and elsewhere it is easy to detect 
traces of irony in Bruni’s presentation of the ancient Romans: their actions are often 
motivated by self-interest as much as by any supposed excellence of character.119 It is 
particularly instructive to compare the Regulus of the De primo bello punico with the 
same figure as portrayed in the De militia, a treatise written by Bruni at about the same 
time. In this latter work, Bruni runs the standard line about Regulus deliberately 
sacrificing his own happiness for that of his country.120 Bruni’s very different treatment 
of the same material in the De primo bello punico illustrates an important feature of his 
approach to writing history, as opposed to working in the treatise form. In writing history 
Bruni leans towards a realistic and rationalistic manner that owes as much to Polybius 
and to Thucydides as it does to Livy. It is not that Bruni is not patriotic when it comes to 
relating Roman history. But he is also capable at times of sidelining the patriotic agenda 
in favor of a more factual and pragmatic approach.  
What Bruni ultimately considers his priority is to present the first Punic War in 
the most straightforward and illuminating way possible. He is perhaps at his best in those 
passages where he exercises his skills in historical explanation, in relative independence 
from the various authorities. Such passages are especially frequent in the latter stages of 
the work, as the war draws to a close. They tend to occur at crucial points in the narrative: 
just after an important battle, for example, or at the start of a new phase in the war. A 
typical instance of this kind can be found after Bruni’s account of the events of 249 B.C. 
As we saw above, these began with the Roman disaster at Drepana. This was then 
followed by the loss of the entire Roman fleet in a storm.121 Polybius relates the general 
situation that ensued at I, 55, 1-4. Bruni does the same in a passage running from p. 51, 
line 27 to p. 52, line 6. Bruni’s passage, however, is quite different in tone from that of 
Polybius. Bruni emphasizes the extent of the Roman predicament in a way that Polybius 
does not. Polybius for example states that while the events of 249 B.C. forced the 
Romans to relinquish their ambitions on the sea, they still maintained their traditional 
superiority on land (I, 55, 2). Bruni prefers to stress that the Romans were now hard 
pressed in all departments, including on land. For with the loss of their fleet, they could 
not longer supply their army at Lilybaeum. Meanwhile in Rome itself, morale was low. 
The treasury was exhausted and private wealth depleted after so many extraordinary 
levies.122 Bruni’s picture may be somewhat overdrawn. It may even appear to implement 
the Livian device of dramatization. Yet Bruni’s focus here is not so much on pathos as on 
predicament. He wants to illustrate in the starkest terms possible the state of affairs in 249 
B.C. when viewed from the Roman perspective. He does so quite independently of 
Polybius. 
A point worth considering is whether Bruni’s rigorous presentation of the Roman 
perspective on events might not actually enhance the explanatory power of his account. 
Telling events from the Roman side can mean partiality; it can also mean greater access 
to interpretative resources. Roman partisanship certainly does not prevent Bruni from 
recognizing Carthaginian excellence in arms. He describes for example Hamilcar Barca 
as “a man of great vision, and extremely well versed in the art of war.”123 Such phrases 
are missing in Polybius’ sketch, and their use by Bruni constitutes yet another sign of the 
latter’s desire to reach out towards standards of historical narrative as classically 
conceived. But there is more to the matter than mere homage to the criteria for historia. 
Bruni’s account of Hamilcar’s activities in and around Eryx, where he harassed the 
Romans from 246 B.C. onwards, suggests once again that his use of analytical skills 
could at times prevail over partisanship. Bruni pays particular attention to describing how 
Hamilcar pinned down the Romans at Eryx. In contrast to Polybius I, 56, Bruni analyzes 
Hamilcar’s moves in strategic terms: the Carthaginian seizure of Hercte disturbs 
communications between the Roman forces stationed at Lilybaeum and Panormus; it also 
places the Roman force at Eryx under effective siege.124 At this point comes a torrent of 
ringing praise from Bruni, unsupported by anything similar in Polybius: “This siege 
lasted nearly three years, with Hamilcar directing operations so brilliantly that he earned 
then and there the right to be called the greatest of all the generals of his day; nor was 
there anything that more terrified the enemy than the name Hamilcar.”125 
Bruni’s admiration for Hamilcar’s exploits continues throughout his description 
of the Carthaginian’s next move: the capture of the town of Eryx. Again Bruni is careful 
to point out the strategic consequences of this feat. By occupying the town, Hamilcar 
creates further havoc in the lines of communication between the Roman forces.126 Once 
again Bruni’s point is all the more striking for its not being explicitly stated by Polybius 
at I, 58, 2-3. In such passages Bruni seems to be extrapolating from the material itself. 
There is no evidence of the use of a supplementary source. Bruni is in other words 
working somewhat in the manner of a modern historian: moving beyond the hard data 
towards its interpretation.127 Bruni’s appreciation for Hamilcar’s tactical brilliance even 
leads him to contradict Polybius on particular details. One example: Polybius notes that 
Hamilcar’s position at Eryx was quite vulnerable due to the supply issue. He stresses that 
the Carthaginians had difficulties with conveying supplies “as they only held one place 
on the sea and one single road connecting with it.”128 Bruni overrides this as improbable, 
and states that in fact the exact opposite was true: “The Carthaginian fleet kept Hamilcar 
supplied, since it had total control of the sea. For the Roman people, as we explained, had 
withdrawn from contesting the seas after the disaster that overtook L. Iunius; the Romans 
from that point on fought on land only, where they felt they held a clear advantage over 
the enemy. But such was Hamilcar’s unique gift of generalship, that on land as well the 
Carthaginian managed to show himself to be equal, and even superior to the Romans.”129  
The whole thrust of Bruni’s argument runs counter to Polybius on these pages. 
Bruni contends that the leadership skills (virtus) of Hamilcar more than leveled the score 
on land, whereas Polybius has the Carthaginians struggling to maintain a foothold. 
Whether or not Bruni’s interpretation has plausibility may well be dubious. Modern 
historians are inclined to follow Polybius on this particular issue.130 Nevertheless the real 
point here is another. It lies in the fact that Bruni mounts an independent interpretation all 
his own. He does not slavishly follow Polybius, nor does he mechanically plug in 
information gleaned from alternative Roman sources. Rather, he forges his own path 
through the material. He does so, to be sure, partly in order to meet the formal demands 
of what he thinks a history should be. But he is also motivated, I would argue, by what 
motivates any modern historian today: the desire to understand the underlying dynamic of 
events, and to convey that understanding to one’s readers.  
Another turning point is reached in or around the year 243 B.C.131 At this stage 
the Romans realize that they are not going to win the war on land alone. They therefore 
take the momentous decision to turn for the third time to the construction of a fleet. 
Bruni’s presentation of this decision and the reasons for it is couched in more dramatic 
language than that used by Polybius. It is instructive to compare the relevant passage in 
Polybius (I, 59, 1-3) with Bruni’s account. Again Bruni tends to fix his attention (and that 
of the reader) on the Roman predicament. He also carefully relates the decision to the 
context of the war as a whole. “Since the war was dragging on in this way,” he writes, 
“and Hamilcar was flying about on land and sea, spreading terror into both Italy and 
Sicily at once, the Romans grew quite restless.” They thus turned their minds once again 
to the task of building a fleet, “for otherwise,” writes Bruni, “the contest seemed destined 
to go on forever, and it was damaging to Rome’s prestige that Italy itself should suffer 
the indignity of being subjected to Carthaginian raids.”132 
Bruni’s elaboration on this turning point in the war is perhaps not surprising, 
given that he had set the stage for it quite effectively by emphasizing all along the 
Carthaginian success on land under the leadership of Hamilcar. Indeed the consistency of 
the Roman decision with Bruni’s portrait of what had gone before leads one to believe 
that Bruni may have deliberately calculated his account of Hamilcar’s gesta as a 
backdrop to the Roman decision to effect a return to sea power. Once the Roman decision 
is taken, the war draws swiftly to its close. There are, however, some considerable 
differences in the way Bruni and Polybius relate the final stages. Both tell of the newly 
constructed Roman fleet arriving off Drepana in 242 B.C., under the command of the 
consul C. Lutatius Catulus. Their accounts match too in stating that the Carthaginian 
navy abandoned Drepana even before the Roman fleet arrived there.133 Polybius, 
however, offers no explanation as to why the Carthaginian fleet quit the area without a 
fight. Modern commentators too are at a loss. Walbank notes that “the reasons behind this 
policy can only be the object of speculation.”134 Speculate is exactly what Bruni attempts 
to do. Bruni opines that the Carthaginians had grown somewhat complacent in regard to 
their superiority on the seas. They were confident—after what had happened in 249 
B.C.—that the Romans would never again be in a position to challenge them in this 
department. So confident were they that they treated reports that Rome was building a 
new fleet as rumors without foundation. They made no effort to prepare their own naval 
force to face a new threat from Rome. So when the Roman fleet did suddenly appear off 
Drepana the Carthaginian reaction was to panic and run.135 
Once again then we see Bruni developing explanatory material to supplement the 
Polybian sketch. Two observations can be made in relation to this particular instance. 
One notes first the way this explanatory passage links up with others we have examined. 
There is a thematic coherence in these final chapters of Bruni’s that runs deeper than 
anything to be found in the pre-existing literature. Bruni pulls together here the disparate 
threads found in the sources and weaves them into a convincing narrative unity. So we 
move with ease from the Roman naval disasters of 249 B.C., to the successes of Hamilcar 
on land, to the Roman decision to turn back to sea power, to Carthaginian complacency, 
followed by panic and flight. This kind of smooth narrative flow is Bruni’s own. It makes 
for masterful history, as both the ancients and we understand it. Second observation: as in 
other cases we have seen, Bruni’s explanation of the Carthaginian flight at Drepana is not 
pure hypothesis. Bruni appears to have used a remark of Polybius at I, 61, 5 as his 
starting point. Polybius notes here that the reason for the Roman success over the 
Carthaginian fleet off the Aegates Islands, 10 March 241 B.C., was Carthaginian 
complacency in relation to their superior sea power. Bruni, however, does more than 
simply transfer this remark to the earlier instance of Drepana: he expands the concept and 
renders it more effective as an explanatory tool. Also, by moving it forward in time to 
Drepana, Bruni inserts the explanation at the point in the narrative where it is most 
needed. Whether or not it really does explain the Carthaginian retreat is of course open to 
question. But Bruni’s solution is at the very least ingenious, and has the added advantage 
of tying in thematically with what had gone before.  
Bruni then was not merely repackaging the information contained in his sources. 
His approach was on the contrary a highly creative one in that it involved going beyond 
the sources to formulate independent interpretations of his own making. Such 
independence did not escape the attention of contemporaries. At least one careful reader 
faulted Bruni for his failure to adhere more closely to the classical authorities, in this case 
Livy. Some twenty years after the publication of the De primo bello punico, Bruni 
received an enquiry from the chief guardian and keeper of Livy’s reputation, Cardinal 
Prospero Colonna. Our source for the Cardinal’s enquiry is Bruni’s response, Epistle IX, 
6, written according to Luiso in the first months of 1442.136 Typically, the Cardinal’s 
objections concerned two passages where Bruni had deviated from the version of events 
given by Livy and his epitomizers. The first instance was by far the more serious. At the 
very beginning of his account of the first Punic War, Bruni had related how in 270 B.C. 
the Romans recaptured Rhegium and put to death the three hundred surviving members 
of the rebel legion that had seized the place unlawfully ten years earlier.137 Cardinal 
Colonna, however, noted that Livy told quite a different story. At XXVIII, xxviii, 2-3 of 
the Ab urbe condita in fact, Livy has Scipio refer to this event in no uncertain terms: “For 
that crime the entire legion, four thousand men, were beheaded in the Forum at Rome.”138 
Livy therefore clearly indicated that four thousand men were put to the sword. How was 
it then that Bruni, in the De primo bello punico, dared to reduce this number to a mere 
three hundred? 
Bruni’s reply is of great interest. He begins by praising the Cardinal for finding 
the time to cultivate a passion for letters. He then comes straight to the business of 
answering the Cardinal’s enquiry. He begins with the general observation that 
divergences exist between the ancient sources, as Livy himself testifies. He then states 
that in his own account of the matter at hand he has followed Polybius (I, 7, 10-13) rather 
than Livy. This leads Bruni to proclaim the validity of Polybius as a reliable source: “…I 
have followed Polybius of Megalopolis, a truly great man, and an outstanding writer, as 
well as an authority of the highest order among the Greeks.”139 Bruni’s words appear to 
echo Livy himself, XXXIII, x, 10: “I have followed Polybius, an authority worthy of 
credence on all matters of Roman history and especially on occurrences in Greece.”140 
The use of this Livian echo seems calculated to obtain the ultimate seal of approval for 
the reliability of Polybius. Yet Bruni is not content with this plain appeal to an alternative 
source. He moves on from here to try to demonstrate the lack of any real contradiction 
between Livy and Polybius on the issue of Rhegium and the rebel legion. The implication 
seems to be that divergences between ancient sources are often more apparent than real.  
Bruni’s response is thus something of a mixed bag. He both admits and denies 
that there are direct contradictions between the accounts handed down in the ancient 
sources. He appeals through Livy to the authority of Polybius, but then swiftly withdraws 
from this position and tries to harmonize the two versions of events with specious 
arguments. He adopts a similar strategy in dealing with the Cardinal’s second query. This 
too concerned Bruni’s failure to follow a strict Livian line in the opening passages of the 
De primo bello punico. Evidently following Polybius, Bruni described the legion at 
Rhegium as being overcome by force of arms. But, as the Cardinal noted, Livian tradition 
represented the legion as surrendering on terms: “The Campanian legion which had 
seized Rhegium was besieged and forced to surrender….”141 Again Bruni’s answer 
involves arguing that the two accounts are not necessarily contradictory, since part of the 
garrison may have surrendered, while another part fought on to the bitter end: “Therefore 
these accounts, which appear to be different, are not different after all. The historians are 
really saying the same thing, although at first glance they may appear to contradict one 
another.”142 
Faced with direct challenges of this kind, Bruni preferred to seek compromise. 
Yet there can be little doubt that both he and his contemporaries were aware that with the 
De primo bello punico he was breaking new ground. The more perspicacious and 
informed among the readership realized that the De primo bello punico did not adhere to 
a strictly Livian line. For the first time in the West, Polybius emerged as a force to be 
reckoned with, and would soon be translated in the curia. Yet what that translation was to 
reveal was that Bruni had not strictly followed Polybius either. In fact what the exchange 
with Cardinal Colonna indicates goes beyond the issue of Polybius and Livy and touches 
on the wider question of authority itself. The exchange shows Bruni in characteristically 
evasive mode, yet bowing to no single authority, confident and self-assured, secure in his 
command of the relevant sources and in his ability to formulate independent judgments as 
to their validity.  
The letter to Cardinal Colonna thus tends to confirm what our close textual 
analysis suggested: in the De primo bello punico Bruni was moving away from the 
traditional notion of sources as constituting authorities to be followed at all costs. He was 
in the process of redefining sources as sources, i.e., as materials to be evaluated and 
exploited as points of departure for an independent account of the past, geared to modern 
interests. The standard view that Bruni merely “Livianized” Polybius does not hold up 
under close scrutiny. Shocking as it may seem, Bruni relativized both Livy and Polybius 
when it came to writing his own account of the first Punic War. This does not mean that 
he ever lost sight of their roles as models for how history should be written. Bruni 
remained a devotee of Livy in this sense, though not as slavish a devotee as is often 
thought. By the same token, Bruni was sensitive to the methods of Greek historians like 
Thucydides and Polybius. A question that deserves further exploration concerns the 
extent to which Bruni’s access to this more analytical Greek tradition sharpened his 
perception of possessing his own personal mission as an independent writer of history. 
 
    Works Cited 
Abbreviations: 
A=Leonardi Aretini…De bello punico…Augsburg, apud Philippum Ulhardum, 1537. 
B=Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi soppressi, F8 1286. 
C=Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, Conventi soppressi, J I 31, ff. 1-41. 
Barbaro, F., Epistolario, 2 vols., ed. C. Griggio (Florence 1991 and 1999). 
Baron, H., The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J. 1966). 
Bertalot, L., Studien zum italienischen und deutschen Humanismus, 2 vols., ed. P. O. 
Kristeller (Rome 1975). 
Billanovich, G., et al., “Per la fortuna di Tito Livio nel rinascimento italiano: Le 
‘emendationes in T. Livium’ del Valla,” Italia medioevale e umanistica 1 (1958) 245-
264. 
Biondo, F., Scritti inediti e rari, ed. B. Nogara (Rome 1927). 
Brown, V., “Caesar,” in Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Medieval and 
Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries, vol. 3, ed. F. E Cranz and P. O. 
Kristeller (Washington, D. C. 1976) 87-139. 
Bruni, L., Epistolarum libri VIII, 2 vols., ed. L. Mehus (Florence 1741). 
Bruni, L., History of the Florentine People, 2 vols. to date, ed. and trans. J. Hankins 
(Cambridge, Mass. 2001-). 
Bruni, L., The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts, ed. and trans. G. Griffiths, 
J. Hankins, D. Thompson (Binghampton, N. Y. 1987). 
Bruni, L. Humanistisch-Philosophische Schriften, ed. H. Baron (Leipzig 1928). 
Bruni, L., La prima guerra punica, ed. A. Cerruti (Bologna 1878). 
Bruni, L., Opere letterarie e politiche, ed. P. Viti (Turin 1996). 
Cabrini, A. M., “Le ‘Historiae’ del Bruni: risultati e ipotesi di una ricerca sulle fonti,” in 
Leonardo Bruni cancelliere della repubblica di Firenze, ed. P. Viti (Florence 1990) 247-
319. 
Catalogue of Books Printed in the XVth Century Now in the British Museum, 9 vols. 
(London 1908-1970). 
Cessi, R. “Notizie umanistiche: tra Niccolò Perotti e Poggio Bracciolini,” Giornale 
storico della letteratura italiana 60 (1912) 73-111. 
Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History, ed. J. Van der Dussen (Oxford 1994). 
de la Mare, A., “Florentine Manuscripts of Livy in the Fifteenth Century,” in Livy, ed. T. 
A. Dorey (London 1971) 177-199. 
Fubini, R., Storiografia dell’umanesimo in Italia da Leonardo Bruni ad Annio da Viterbo 
(Rome 2003). 
Gentili, B., et al., History and Biography in Ancient Thought (Amsterdam 1988). 
Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, 8 vols. to date (Leipzig 1925-) 
Graesse, J. G. T., Trésor des livres rares et précieux, 8 vols. (Dresden 1859-1869). 
Gualdo Rosa, L., “Una prolusione inedita di Francesco Filelfo del 1429,” in Francesco 
Filelfo nel quinto centenario della morte (Padua 1986) 275-323. 
Hankins, J., Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance, 1 vol. to date (Rome 
2003-). 
Hankins, J., Repertorium Brunianum, 1 vol. to date (Rome 1997-). 
Jal, P., Introduction to Abrégé des livres de l’histoire romaine de Tite-Live (Paris 1984). 
Lazenby, J. F., The First Punic War: A Military History (London and new York 2003). 
Luiso, F. P., Studi su l’epistolario di Leonardo Bruni, ed. L. Gualdo Rosa (Rome 1980). 
Marais, P., et al., Catalogue des incunables de la Bibliothéque Mazarine (Paris 1893). 
Mercati, G., Per la cronologia della vita e degli scritti di Niccolò Perotti (Rome 1925). 
Momigliano, A., “Polybius’ Reappearance in Western Europe,” in Essays in Ancient and 
Modern Historiography (Oxford 1977) 79-98. First published in Polybe: Entretiens sur 
l’antiquité classique (Vandoeuvres-Geneva 1974) 347-372. 
Pace, N., “La traduzione di Niccolò Perotti delle Historiae di Polibio,” Studi umanistici 
piceni 8 (1988) 221-234. 
Pédech, P., La méthode historique de Polybe (Paris 1964). 
Polybius, The Histories, 6 vols., trans. W. R. Paton (London 1922-1927). 
Regoliosi, M., “Lorenzo Valla, Antonio Panormita, Giacomo Curlo e le emendazioni a 
Livio,” Italia medioevale e umanistica 24 (1981) 287-316. 
Regoliosi, M., “Nuove ricerche intorno a Giovanni Tortelli,” Italia medioevale e 
umanistica 12 (1969) 129-196. 
Renouard, P., Imprimeurs et libraires parisiens du XVIe siècle, 2 vols. (Paris 1964 and 
1969). 
Reynolds, B., “Bruni and Perotti Present a Greek Historian,” Bibliothèque d’humanisme 
et Renaissance 16 (1954) 108-118. 
Sacks, K., Polybius on the Writing of History (Berkeley, Calif. 1981). 
Santini, E., “Leonardo Bruni Aretino e i suoi Historiarum florentini populi libri XII,” 
Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 22 (1910) 3-173. 
Traversari, A., Latinae epistolae…a domino Petro Canneto…in libros XXV tributae, 2 
vols, ed. L. Mehus (Florence 1759). 
Ullman, B., et al., The Public Library of Renaissance Florence: Niccolò Niccoli, Cosimo 
de’ Medici and the Library of San Marco (Padua 1972). 
Valla, L. Antidotum in Facium, ed. M. Regoliosi (Padua 1981). 
Vespasiano da Bisticci, Le vite, 2 vols., ed. A. Greco (Florence 1970 and 1976). 
Viti, P., “Note sul proemio ai Commentarii primi belli punici di Leonardo Bruni,” 
Interpres 18 (1999) 165-171. 
Walbank, F. W., A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols. (Oxford 1957-1979). 
Walsh, P. G., Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (Cambridge 1961). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Thus wrote Ambrogio Traversari to Francesco Barbaro in 1418: “Leonardus Arretinus Commentaria 
scribere de primo bello punico ex Polybio coepit; opus, ut audio, egregium; nam ipse non vidi.” See 
Traversari 1759, 2: 292. For the date of the letter see Barbaro, 1: 344. The letter suggests that Bruni began 
work on the De primo bello punico sometime in 1418.  
2 The publication date has often been given as 14 December 1421 on the basis of the colophon in Florence, 
Biblioteca Laurenziana, Plut. 65, 14, f. 53. See e.g. Bruni 1928, 167, and Luiso 1980, 99. See also however, 
Bertalot, 1975, 2: 390, who pointed out (in 1931) that the colophon in question refers to the publication 
date of the treatise De militia—also contained in Plut. 65, 14—not to that of the De primo bello punico. 
Hankins 1997, 1: 42 has recently confirmed this point. The De primo bello punico was in any case 
published prior to 31 January 1422, for on that day Bruni wrote to Giovanni Tortelli, promising to send him 
a copy of the work: see Bruni 1741, 1: 132 (Ep. IV, 18). For the date of this letter see Bruni 1928, 207; 
Luiso 1980, 99; and Regoliosi 1969, 130-131.  
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Gualdo Rosa 1986, 307. 
4 Biondo 1927, 115-116.  
5 Flor. I, xviii; Eutr. II, 18-27; Oros. IV, 7, 1--IV, 11, 4. 
6 de la Mare 1971, 186.  
7 Hankins 1997, 1: ad indices; and now Hankins 2003, 1: 189. 
8 Numerous manuscripts of the volgarizzamento allude to its having been executed by a friend and disciple 
of Bruni. For speculation as to the identity of the translator see Hankins 2003, 1: 251. Florence, Biblioteca 
nazionale, II. II. 69, f. 215v bears the inscription “Questo libro fu chopiato per me Michele d’Andrea 
Singnorini della propria origine che fece vulgarizzare detto messer Lionardo…”: see Bruni 1928, 167, and 
Hankins 1997, 1: 61. 
9 The first edition appeared in Venice, c. 1471: Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke 1932, 5: 584-585. There 
followed six more Venetian editions of the volgare text (1478, 1485, 1490, 1493, 1502, 1511), all of which 
included it as a supplement to the Italian translation of the three decades of Livy then known. A similar 
pattern is repeated in France, on a lesser scale. Bruni’s De primo bello punico appears in a French 
translation by Jean Le Bègue in the first French language edition of Livy, Paris, 1486-1487: Marais et al. 
1893, 228-229. Two further Parisian editions of Livy in French also contain the Le Bègue translation of 
Bruni’s De primo bello punico: 1515 and 1530. 
10 Thus the first edition of the Latin text, per Jacobum Britannicum, Brescia, 24 October 1498, presents the 
work as Polybius…de primo bello punico ex graeco in latinum traductus per Leonardum Aretinum: see 
Catalogue of Books Printed in the XVth Century Now in the British Museum 1935, 7: 982. Another edition 
under the same heading appeared in Venice, 8 November 1504: see Graesse 1864, 5: 395. A third edition 
was printed in Paris, 30 January 1512, by Josse Badius Ascensius and Jean Petit: see Renouard 1969 2: 98. 
11 Duly noted for example by Niccolò Perotti in a letter to Giovanni Tortelli of 27 February 1452: Cessi 
1912, 77. 
12 Perotti executed his translation of Polybius, Books I-V, between 1452 and 1454: see Mercati 1925, 36, 
and now Pace 1988, 221. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 A subsequent edition of the volgare text appeared in the Scelta di curiosità letterarie inedite o rare, 
dispensa CLXV: Bruni 1878. Hankins 2003, 1: 22, singles out a new edition of the Latin text as one of the 
chief desiderata of contemporary Bruni scholarship. 
14 Santini 1910, 22-23. 
15 Reynolds 1954, 111-113. The list compiled by Reynolds also includes Orosius, Eutropius, and the 
Periochae. Bruni’s use of Zonaras appears to me doubtful: the two main instances cited by Reynolds both 
come from Aulus Gellius, VII, iii and iv. Reynolds also says that Bruni was mistaken in giving the number 
of elephants captured by the Romans at Panormus (250 BC) as 140, whereas the Periochae give 120, 
Eutropius 130, and Florus 100. But Bruni probably took the figure 140 from Pliny, Natural History, VIII, 
vi, 16. If so, Pliny the Elder should be added to the list of Bruni’s sources, along with Aulus Gellius. Also 
to be added to the list is Diodorus Siculus, as we shall see later in this study. 
16 Baron 1966, 410. 
17 Reynolds 1954, 108 and 118. 
18 Momigliano 1977, 79-98. 
19 Ibid., 84. 
20 For those mentioned here see Walsh 1961, 143 ff., 174 ff., and 219 ff. 
21 Leonardi Aretini…de bello punico…, Augsburg: apud Philippum Ulhardum, 1537 (hereafter A). This 
edition, however, like all the others, contains many corrupt readings. I have used two manuscripts in 
particular to restore the text where necessary: Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppressi F8 1286 
(hereafter B), and Florence, Biblioteca nazionale, Conventi soppressi J 1 31 (hereafter C). On the latter see 
Ullman et al. 1972, 234. 
22 See also Giannozzo Manetti, Oratio funebris in solemni Leonardi…laureatione, in Bruni 1741, 1: CII: 
“…dictavit denique de primo bello punico libros tres….” Similarly Vespasiano da Bisticci 1970, 1: 481 
lists three books. Poggio, however, cites the work as being in two books: Poggii Bracciolini oratio funebris 
in obitu Leonardi Arretini, in Bruni 1741, 1: CXXIII. 
23 Bruni 1928, 122-123. An English translation is available in Bruni 1987, 192-193. The most recent study 
of the preface is that by Viti 1999, 165-171. 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Bruni 1928, 123: “Quorum uterque patriae affectus suae ac studio partium inductus, etsi non circa rei 
gestae seriem, circa belli tamen causas iustitiamque excessisse modum putatur.” 
25 Ibid.: “Philinum deinde Polybius…secutus est; Fabium autem e nostris plures, sed praecipuae claritatis 
Livius Patavinus, Romanae pater historiae.” 
26 Ibid.: “Cuius libri si exstarent, nihil opus erat novo labore.” 
27 Ibid.: “…commotus ipse ob maiorum nostrorum gloriam, ne rerum tam praeclare tamque magnifice 
gestarum memoria deperiret….” Translation in Bruni 1987, 193, here slightly modified. 
28 Cfr. Lazenby 2003, x-xi. 
29 See for example his criticism of Roman impetuosity: Polyb. I, 37, 7-10. Bruni of course was careful not 
to repeat such remarks: A, p. 36. 
30 Polybius believed that the primary purpose of history was to teach statesmen about politics and the 
conduct of war: see Polyb. I, 1, 2; II, 56; III, 21, 9-10. Useful modern studies include Pèdech 1964, and 
Gentili et al. 1988, esp. 21 ff. 
31 Walsh 1961, 114-137, lists the earlier Roman annalists upon whom Livy relied. 
32 Polyb. I, 3, 1; I, 5, 1-4; I, 13. 
33 On this point I follow the analysis of Sacks 1981, 171-180. 
34 Bruni, 1928, 122; Bruni 1987, 192. See also Viti 1999, 166. 
35 Bruni 1928, 122, lines 3 and 22; 123, line 11. The word usually figures in the title of the Latin 
manuscripts. Bruni also designates the work as commentaria in his correspondence: e. g., Bruni 1741, 1: 
132, 134. See as well A, p. 12, l. 7: “Quoniam vero huius belli commentaria scripturi sumus….” 
36 Bruni 1741, 1: 135 (IV, 20): “Illa enim amplior et diligentior est: haec contractiora et minus explicata. 
Livius quoque in Romuli, et in Hostilii, et Tarquinii Regum Romanorum gestis referendis non annos 
proseguitur, sed rerum summam. Idem Polybius facit, et ipse quidem probatus auctor, cujus auctoritatem 
secuti sumus.” Luiso 1980, 100 dates the letter between 1422 and 1424. Regoliosi 1969, 130 places it early 
in 1422, thus shortly after the publication of the De primo bello punico. For the English translation, here 
slightly modified, see Bruni 1987, 180. 
37 Polyb. I, 13, 7; II, 35, 10. 
38 Sacks 1981, 172-173. 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 Livy defines Polybius as “haudquaquam spernendus auctor” (XXX, 45, 5). Another Livian passage bears 
some comparison to Bruni’s: “…sed Polybium secutus sumus, non incertum auctorem…” (XXXIII, 10, 
10). Cicero too labeled Polybius “bonus auctor in primis” (Off. III, 32, 113). 
40 On the return to fashion of Caesar’s Commentarii, see Brown 1976, 3: 87-139. Cicero’s usage of the term 
commentarii tends to be confined to the sense of rough notes written for use in a literary work: see his letter 
to Lucceius in Fam. V, 12, 10; or Brut. lxxiv, 262. The latter work was not yet available to Bruni when he 
began writing the De primo bello punico in 1418. 
41 Polyb. I, 10, 2; Lazenby 2003, 37. 
42 Reynolds 1954, 111. See A, p. 2, ll. 10-12: “Mamertini…adversus Siciliae civitates se facile tutabantur.” 
43 Polyb. I, 8, 1; Lazenby 2003, 35-36. 
44 A, p. 3, ll. 27-30: “Et praevalebat sane apud Mamertinos Romani Populi nomen, quod ipsi Italici generis 
orti, nostris potius quam externis salutem suam creditam volebant.” 
45 Polyb. I, 10, 1; Lazenby 2003, 37. 
46 In the Livian account the Senate determines to help the Mamertines after heated debate: Livy, Epit. Per. 
XVI. Cfr. Polyb. I, 10-11. On the discrepancy and its implications, see Walbank 1957, 1: 60-61. 
47 A, p. 3, l. 35—p. 4, l. 3: “…rem infectam senatus dimiserat. Non destiterunt tamen Mamertini, qui 
Romam venerant, sed fautoribus quibusdam freti, rem ad plebem detulere….” Bruni repeated this Polybian 
version of events in his Difesa contro i riprensori del popolo di Firenze nella impresa di Lucca (1431): 
Bruni 1996, 766. Walbank 1957, 1: 61, thinks Polyb. I, 11, 2 refers to the matter being taken before the 
comitia tributa.  
48 Polyb. I, 11, 2. 
49 Lazenby 2003, 39-40; Walbank 1957, 1: 61: “the reference is to booty pure and simple.” 
50 A, p. 4, ll. 11-18. 
51 Polyb. I, 10, 5-9. 
52 Ibid., I, 11, 2. 
53 A, p. 5, ll. 17-24: “Maxime vero e populi Romani dignitate visum est, ante omnia de pace agere. Nam 
foedera cum Carthaginensibus saepius iam ad eam diem renovata extabant, per quae etsi licebat populo 
Romano Mamertinos in amicitiam fidemque suscipere, tamen humanum videbatur pacem, nihil praesertim 
                                                                                                                                                 
habituram nocumenti, offerre. Servata enim Mamertinorum libertate, Syracusanis item in suis 
consistentibus, minus erat populo Romano Carthaginensium formidanda potentia.” B, f. 6v, and C, f. 2v 
both have suscepisse for suscipere. 
54 Polyb. I, 6. 
55 Ibid., I, 11, 14-15; I, 12, 1-3. 
56 A, p. 5, ll. 27-35. 
57 Ibid., p. 5, line 35—p. 6, line 4: “Carthaginenses quoque, auxilio Hieronis nudati, percussisque metu 
militibus et virtutem Romanorum plus aequo formidantibus, soluta confestim obsidione, nec ultra castris 
fidere ausi, per Siciliae urbes quae in fide ipsorum erant dividuntur.” B, f. 7, and C, f. 2v both have 
perculsisque for percussisque. 
58 Polyb. I, 17, 8. 
59 As Reynolds notes, 1954, 110, 116, Bruni got the name of the second consul wrong; he lists him as 
Quintus Aemilius: A, p. 7, line 12. For the correct name, Quintus Mamilius, see Polyb. I, 17, 6, and 
Lazenby 2003, 55. 
60 A, p. 7, ll. 11-19: “Post hos creati consules L. Posthumius et Q. Aemilius in Siciliam veniunt. Hi 
susceptis ab antecessoribus copiis, primo adventu de modo administrandi belli cum inter se consultarent, 
placuit audacius quam superiores fecerant consules incumbere, nec iam levia consectando aut diviso 
pluribus locis bello, sed ambos simul consules omnibus copiis Agrigentum ipsum Poenorum caput ac belli 
arcem invadere, ut sive non recusaret hostis confestim inirent pugnam, sive recusaret inclusum moenibus 
obsiderent.” 
61 A, p. 7, ll. 20-23: “Carthaginenses autem munitionibus urbis confisi, ac totius rei discrimen subire non 
ausi, ante moenia militem continebant, nec adventantibus Romanis copiam pugnandi fecere.” The passage 
in A is corrupt. For the reading I give here see B, f. 8v, and C, f. 3v. 
62 A, p. 7, ll. 23-29: “Consules igitur…obsidere urbem pergunt, non ignari magnam vim frumenti a Poenis 
iam antea congestam, sed confisi, quod amplius quinquaginta hominum milia intra moenia obsidebantur, 
eam multitudinem quamvis magnam vim annonae absumpturam.” B, f. 8v, and C, f. 3v both have brevi 
absumpturam.  
63 Polyb. I, 18, 7. 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 A, p. 9, ll. 12-19: “Nam si Hannoni novoque exercitui obviam procederent, obsidio tam diu protracta, ac 
iam pene ad extremum perducta irrito labore erat deserenda; sin perstarent in obsidione, Hanno cum 
exercitu vagari impune per Siciliam, socias civitates opprimere, commeatus impedire poterat. Re igitur in 
consilio discussa, placuit tandem consulibus haud quaquam abscedere, sed quasvis difficultates, ut urbe 
potiantur, perpeti.” B, f. 10, and C, f. 4v have Re in consilio discussa. 
65 A, p. 9, ll. 22-23. 
66 Ibid., p. 9, l. 24: “…tandem Herbesum oppidum, quod horreum exercitus populi Romani ad eam diem 
fuerat, per proditionem recepit.” 
67 For Bruni’s knowledge of Diodorus Siculus see Cabrini 1990, 252. 
68 Polyb. I, 18, 10-11. 
69 A, p. 9, ll. 25-27: “Cum nihilominus perstarent in obsidione consules, statuit Hanno, quo magis 
facultatem importandi commeatus precideret, castra propius admovere.” A has procideret; for precideret 
see B, f. 10v.  
70 Polyb. I, 19, 1-2. 
71 A, p. 10, ll. 5-7; cfr. Polyb. I, 18, 10. 
72 A, p. 10, ll. 9-15; Polyb. I, 19, 1. 
73 A, p. 10, ll. 15-20. 
74 A, p. 10, ll. 20-22: “Pervicit tamen in his difficultatibus ferocia consulum, qui cuncta dura atque aspera 
ferre potius quam irrito conatu desistere constituerant.” A has perficit; for pervicit see B, f. 11, and C, f. 5. 
75 A, p. 11, ll. 29-32: “Septimo tandem mense, postquam obsideri ceptum erat, in populi Romani 
potestatem Agrigentum pervenit, tanto sudore militum et tollerantia ducum, ut ea obsidio inter paucas, quae 
unquam fuerint, laboriosissima numeretur.” 
76 Lazenby 2003, 81. 
77 Polyb. I, 26, 1. 
78 A, p. 22, ll. 3-7: “Romae interea saepe in Senatu, saepe etiam apud plebem agitatum est, num bellum 
transferre in Africam praestaret. Facilem enim ubique descensum, et imbelles Libyae populos esse 
constabat, praeterea ut in longa pace omnis generis praeda refertos agros.” A has praeterea in longa pace; 
for the reading given here see B, f. 23, and C, f. 10. 
                                                                                                                                                 
79 Polyb. I, 30, 1-3. 
80 Ibid., I, 30, 4. 
81 A, p. 29, ll. 28-31. 
82 Lazenby 2003, 101. 
83 For the version of Dio Cassius see Lazenby 2003, 101-102. Reynolds 1954, 112, believes that Bruni 
accessed Dio Cassius through the twelfth-century Byzantine chronicler Zonaras, but I find no evidence of 
this. 
84 Collingwood 1994, 231 ff. 
85 A, p. 30, ll. 2-5: “Quando non odio, neque acerbitate susceptum erat bellum, sed metu quodam maioris 
potentiae, qua ne conculcaretur Italia, Romani formidarant.”  
86 Bruni’s words faintly echo those of Hannibal to his Roman prisoners after the battle of Cannae: “…non 
internecivum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum; de dignitate atque imperio certare” (Livy XXII, lviii, 3). 
87 A, p. 30, ll. 8-12: “Amicitiam insuper, et foedera saepius inter utrunque populum renovata ex scripto 
recitarunt: et se fidos vetustosque populi Romani socios asserentes, causas autem belli non ex quibusdam 
iniuriis, sed ex inani suspicione coortas, attenuare susceptam causam nitebantur.” A has sed inani 
suspicione. For the reading given here see B, f. 31. 
88 A, p. 30, ll. 12-15: “Quoniam vero in foederum mentionem incidimus, utile putamus, ab initio repetentes, 
foedera ipsa ut scripta conventaque fuerant, pro cognitione rerum in hoc loco inserere.” 
89 Polyb. III, 24, 1-2; Lazenby 2003, 31-32. 
90 Polyb. III, 24, 4; A, p. 31, ll. 1-4. 
91 A, p. 31, ll. 17-19; cfr. Polyb. III, 24, 14-16. 
92 A, p. 31, ll. 30-32: “Quae tunc recitantes legati pacem se apud Marcum Attilium facilius consequi posse 
arbitrabantur.” 
93 A, p. 31, ll. 33-35: “Consul se haud ignarum foederis esse respondit, atque eo gravius offensum populum 
Romanum quod Carthaginenses bellum, quam pacem, offerente nuper Appio Claudio consule, maluissent.” 
94 A, p. 5, ll. 17-24; Polyb. I, 11, 11-12. 
                                                                                                                                                 
95 A, p. 31, line 35—p. 32, line 3: “Nam licuisse populo Romano Mamertinos liberum populum in 
amicitiam suscipere haud ambiguum esse, cum in Africa tantum et Sardinia habere oppidum Romani ex 
foedere prohibiti essent, in Sicilia autem non essent.” 
96 Polyb. III, 26, 6-7. 
97 Ibid., I, 35; cfr. A, p. 35, ll. 1-7. 
98 Cic., Nat.D. II, 7; Div. I, 29; II, 20 and 71. Cicero’s own views were of course those of the skeptic. 
99 A, pp. 46-49. 
100 Ibid., p. 47, ll. 14-18; cfr. Polyb. I, 49, 6-7. 
101 A, p. 47, ll. 20-21: “Hinc tumultus et trepidatio apud hostes maiorem in modum excitata est.” 
102 Polyb. I, 49, 10-11. 
103 A, p. 47, ll. 29-33: “Addit in extrema oratione non se illos in pericula mittere, sed una secum ut 
capessant pericula, rogare: se quidem primum iturum, nec verbo magis quam re ducem in praelio futurum, 
proinde navim suam conspiciant, eamque sequantur.” 
104 Ibid., p. 47, line 35: “Ipse ut pollicitus erat, princeps duxit….” Cfr. Polyb. I, 49, 12. 
105 A, p. 48, ll. 7-8: “Ea primum imperitia ducis animos militum fregit….” Cfr. Polyb. I, 50, 3. 
106 A, p. 49, ll. 8-10: “Adherbal igitur, ut par erat, magnam laudem assequutus est, utpote qui magnitudine 
animi, et industria, amissam rei maritimae gloriam civibus suis recuperasset.” The qui is missing in A; see 
however B, f. 50v, and C, f. 22. 
107 A, p. 49, ll. 32-33: “Ingenti eas laetitia  Carthaginenses videre ac magni honores Adherbali Senatus 
decreto tributi.” 
108 Lazenby 2003 136.  
109 A, p. 13, ll. 8-9: “Antiquissimi omnium Siciliae populorum incoluisse illam dicuntur Cyclopes et 
Lestrigones, quorum origo nequaquam clara est, utpote a poetis magis quam ab historicis memorata.” Cfr.: 
Thuc. VI, ii, 1. See also Thuc. I, x, 1. Bruni, however, draws a stronger contrast between the relative truth 
value of history and poetry than does Thucydides. The passage in the De primo bello punico is akin to a 
programmatic statement contained in Book One of Bruni’s History of the Florentine People. See Bruni 
2001, 1: 22: “…ut alienior a poetarum figmentis, sic intemeratior ac purior historia….” On the importance 
of this latter passage see Fubini 2003, 172. 
                                                                                                                                                 
110 On Livy’s penchant for the marvelous see Walsh 1961, 61 ff. 
111 As notes Lazenby 2003, 100. 
112 A, p. 27, ll. 22-25: “Per hoc tempus apud Bagradam fluvium castra habens M. Attilius serpentem 
horrendae magnitudinis apud ripas eius fluminis stabulantem balistis et cathapultis oppugnatum occidit.” A 
has Bagradum; for the reading given here see B, f. 28v. 
113 “Atilius Regulus in Africa serpentem portentosae magnitudinis cum magna clade militum occidit.” 
114 Gell. VII, iii: “Tubero in Historiis scriptum reliquit, bello primo Poenico Atilium Regulum consulem in 
Africa, castris apud Bagradam flumen positis, proelium grande atque acre fecisse adversus unum serpentem 
in illis locis stabulantem invisitatae immanitatis, eumque magna totius exercitus conflictione balistis atque 
catapultis diu oppugnatum, eiusque interfecti corium longum pedes centum et viginti Romam missum 
esse.” 
115 A, p. 27, ll. 25-26: “Cuius postea corium Romam delatum centum viginti pedum longitudinem habuisse 
quidam memoriae prodiderunt.”  
116 E. g., Lazenby 2003, 106. 
117 A, p. 37, ll. 23-27: “Per idem fere tempus M. Attilium Regulum, quem supra captum diximus, 
Carthaginenses Romam miserunt, causa vero mittendi fuit, quod commutationem captivorum fieri optabant. 
Idque per favorem eius viri facile se consequi posse arbitrabantur.” A has oportebat; for optabant see B, f. 
38v, and C, f. 17. 
118 A, p. 37, ll. 30-31: “Inter caetera inquit vereri se, ne venenum non praesentarium Carthaginenses sibi 
praebuissent.” A has praesentaneum. For praesentarium see B, f. 39, and C, f. 17, as well as the 
corresponding passage in Gell. VII, iv, 1. 
119 Thus in relating the naval battle off Ecnomus, 256 BC, Bruni notes that the fighting spirit of the Romans 
owed more to desire for personal glory than to vera virtus. See A, p. 25, ll. 5-7: “Plura enim milites in 
praeliis faciunt, vel ignominiae metu, vel gloriae cupiditate, quam vera virtute.” The allusion is not present 
in the corresponding account of Polybius, I, 28. 
120 Bruni, De militia, in Bruni 1996, 688-690: “Quid Marcus Attilius Regulus…nonne captus ab hostibus 
cum Romam commutationis gratia captivorum missus esset, commutationem dissuasit, quia cum rei 
                                                                                                                                                 
republice detrimento fieri intelligebat? Quam ob causam ab iisdem postea hostibus est supplicio affectus. 
Sed ille patrie consulere voluit, non sibi, et salutem publicam proprie antetulit.” 
121 Lazenby 2003, 139-140. 
122 A, p. 51, line 27—p. 52, line 3: “Tantis igitur incomodis acceptis, rursus evenit Carthaginensium rem 
superiorem fieri. Nam Romani nuper magno navali praelio apud Drepanum superati, tunc autem omnino 
amissa classe mari quidem excesserunt. Terra quoque non satis bonam spem habebant. Nam qui ad 
Lilybaeum in castris erant, post casum illum consulis amisso frumento, facultate etiam importandi sublata, 
praesenti inopia et futuro metu premebantur. Romae autem tot clades subinde acceptae, patrum simul ac 
plebis fregerant animos, exinanito iam pridem tot sumpitibus aerario, et singulorum patrimoniis crebra 
tributorum pensione exhaustis.” Cfr. Polyb. I, 55, 1-4. 
123 A, p. 52, ll. 23-24: “…ingentis spiritus virum, ac singulari scientia rei militaris….” 
124 Ibid., p. 53, ll. 2-7: “Ex quo plane evenit eos qui Erycem occupaverant, a Carthaginensibus obsideri. Ex 
alia siquidem parte Drepanum a castris Romanis, quae ad Lilybaeum erant, excludebat; ex alia vero 
Hamilcaris praesidium adeundi Panormum facultatem abstulerat. Ita circumventi in medio Romani in Eryce 
obsidebantur non minus quam Carthaginenses in Lilybaeo.” Cfr. Polyb. I, 56, 9-11. 
125 A, p. 53, ll. 7-11: “Haec obsidio fere triennium duravit, Hamilcare sic impigre rem gerente, ut summi 
nomen ducis omnium aetatis suae in eo bello consequeretur, nec quicquam erat terribilius apud hostes 
quam Hamilcaris nomen.” 
126 Ibid., p. 53, ll. 27-30: “Quo facto utrunque iam praesidium durius obsidebatur. Nam qui in vertice 
montis erant, omnino exclusi a suis ac circunventi perstabant; et qui infra urbem erant, inter Drepanum et 
Erycem clausi undique ab hostibus premebantur.” The word durius is missing in A. See, however, B, f. 55, 
and C, f. 24. 
127 Bruni’s analysis of the military situation at Eryx bears comparison with that of Lazenby 2003, 148. 
128 Polyb. I, 58, 3. 
129 A, p. 54, ll. 8-12: “Commeatum Hamilcari classis libero mari suppeditabat. Nam populus Romanus, ut 
diximus, post L. Iunii naufragium mari abstinuerat, terrae vero incubuerat, in qua se praevalere hostibus 
facile arbitrabantur. Sed tanta erat unius Hamilcaris virtus, ut terra quoque Romanis aut par, aut superior 
esset.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
130 Lazenby 2003, 148. 
131 Ibid., 150. 
132 A, p. 54, ll. 20-26: “Cum in hunc modum traheretur bellum, et Hamilcar terra marique volitaret, ac 
Italiam simul Siciliamque terrore involveret, commoti maiorem in modum Romani, quando aliter nullam 
finem habiturum certamen videbatur, et contra decus Romani nominis erat, populationem Italiae perpeti, ad 
studium parandae classis iterum convertuntur.” 
133 Ibid., p. 55, ll. 12-14: “Catulus vero liberum nactus mare, primo adventu Drepani portum, quem 
Carthaginenses ad eam diem unice semper custodierant, nullo repugnante occupavit.” Cfr. Polyb. I, 59, 9. 
134 Walbank 1957, 1: 124. See also Lazenby 2003, 150 and 152. 
135 A, p. 54, line 34—p. 55, line 12: “Carthaginenses libera iam aliquot annos possessio maris segniores ad 
studia rerum maritimarum reddiderat. Sperabantque Romanos, quoniam multis cladibus afflicti, sponte sua 
mari excesserant, nihil de caetero classe molituros. Denique nunciantibus Romae parari classem non satis 
fidei a Carthaginensibus tribuebatur. Nec sane minus exinanitum publice aerarium longis belli sumptibus 
apud Carthaginenses fuerat quam apud Romanos. Itaque prius circa Siciliam conspecta est Romana classis 
quam a Carthaginensibus fides adhibeatur. Igitur Luctatius Consul ubi primum circa Siciliam classem 
pulcherrimam ac omnibus rebus optime structam ostendit, omnes Carthaginensium naves ob praesentiam 
eius conterritae, desertis Siciliae littoribus se in Africam receperunt.” 
136 Luiso 1980, 152. Prospero Colonna’s original is lost. Bruni’s response is in Bruni 1741, 2: 150-152. The 
Cardinal’s interest in Livy is well documented: see e. g., Billanovich et al. 1958, 245-264; Valla 1981, 324-
325, 336, 338-339; Regoliosi 1981, 287-316. 
137 A, p. 1, line 28—p. 2, line 7: “Confecto autem bello et victoria parta Romani scelus militum suorum 
ulcisci properantes Rhegium obsederunt, ac tandem expugnaverunt. Ad quatuor milia militum tanti 
facinoris conscia intus erant. Eorum maxima pars dum acrius ob metum supplicii resistit, in ipso ardore 
captae urbis per iram caesa, trecentum solum vivi in potestatem redacti, qui e vestigio Romam missi, in 
foro virgis caesi, et securi percussi, scelerati poenas dedere.” 
138 “…propter quod facinus tota legio, milia hominum quattuor, in foro Romae securi percussi sunt.” 
139 Bruni 1741, 2: 151: “…Polybium Megalopolitanum secutus sum, magnum profectum virum, et 
scriptorem egregium, ac summae apud Graecos auctoritatis.”  
                                                                                                                                                 
140 “…sed Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue 
in Graecia gestarum.” 
141 Bruni 1741, 2: 152: “Restat alia dubitatio, quod Florus in deditionem acceptos, ego expugnatos dixi.” 
The reference is to Livy, Epit. Per. XV. Bruni and his contemporaries attributed the authorship of the 
Periochae to Florus. For a recent discussion of the authorship issue—still largely unresolved—see Jal 
1984, xxiii-lv. 
142 Bruni 1741, 2: 152: “Itaque haec, quae diversa videntur, non sunt diversa. Et idem dicunt scriptores, 
licet primo aspectu diversa dicere videantur.” 
